There are three senses that this question carries. The first is if a computer as we know them today could realize mental experiences of the same kind that we have. Think of any conscious experience that you've ever had and then this question is a matter of realizing that same experience with a computer. To this sense of the question, I say, no. This is not physically possible. On this I'll say more later. The second sense of the question is as to whether computers as we know them today could realize any kind of mind even if distinct from our own kind. To this I say, probably. In the typical discourse on this topic I don't see this distinction being often made or when it is made it's done so in passing with very little import placed on it. But since the qualitative character of mental experience is at the core of the hard problem of consciousness, this distinction is essential. Just what about a physical state determines the qualities of being in such a state. And what about the qualities of being in such a state determine its causal efficacy in the world? On a physicalist world view, changing the phsycial characteristics of a state ought to change the qualities of being in that state if it's like anything at all. And for a phenomenal realist, something about the qualities of being in a state ought to make a difference in the causal efficacy of that state. So if we could create a computer that behaved in every way like a biological brain, then we should have good reason to believe that it is like something to be that computer and what it is like is exactly what it is like to be the corresponding brain states if phenomenal realism is true. But the converse must also true. If the physical states of the computer are different in kind from the brain states then the qualities of being in those states must be different from the qualities of being in the corresponding brain states. And since computers are in no way materialistically or structurally like brains we ought to conclude that there are no physical grounds for accepting that being in any computer state would be qualitatively like being in brain states. But since those computer states are physical, it could be like something to be in those states.

The third sense is becoming more common: can a computer perform tasks that humans can do. This is a purely functional sense. The only aspect of importance about minds is utility. Oddly, utility historically has not been an important aspect in the philosophy of mind. For example, the problem of other minds is the problem of lacking a way of reliably knowing despite behavior whether or not objects other than yourself have minds. So, accepting that utility is enough to establish mentality seems rather naive. After all, on a hot summer day, you could sit at my feet beneath my casted shadow as though I were a tree and yet I can promise you that I will remain not a tree. In general, the less specific our questions and the more vague our intrests, the more satisfied we will be with a multitude of answers that contradict each other. There is no response that stands as an answer without a relation to a specific question.

I accept a physicalist thesis that everything that exists in our world is physical and not spiritual or magical or otherwise non-physical. The problem with this question is that "digital"